

PALESTINE IN AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON GENOCIDE

Professor Martin Shaw

Department of International Relations
University of Sussex
Falmer
Brighton BN1 9SJ, UK
martinshaw34@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This article discusses what may be involved in treating the 1948 destruction of a large part of Arab society in Palestine as 'genocide'. It argues that genocide is a general sociological concept which can be applied to many historical cases varying in scale, murderousness, ideological motivation, etc., so applying genocide analysis does not imply a comparison to any other specific case. The article analyses the Palestinian case in the context of an international perspective on the historical development of genocide, and discusses the significance of differences over the historical explanation of the 1948 events for a genocide perspective.

Scholars have not generally framed the question of Israel and Palestine – much studied, discussed and fought over for sixty years – within the perspective of genocide. It may reasonably be asked why, at this juncture, one should introduce the inevitably controversial discourse of 'genocide' into the already crowded debate about Israeli policies towards Palestinians.

Two kinds of answer seem possible. First, it can be contended that genocide is already part of the political, if not the scholarly, debate. It has long been contended, after all, that the Arabs in the 1948 aimed at genocide of the Jewish people – 'to throw the Jews into the sea' as the popular phrase put it – an argument put by the Israeli scholar Yehoshafat Harkabi who also claims that they aimed at 'politicide', the destruction of the Jewish political entity (quoted by Shlaim 2001: 80). Moreover, behind this claim of an intended Arab genocide in 1948 lies the real experience of genocide by European Jews at the hands of the Nazis, of which Israeli Jews fear a repetition. Thus new versions of this claim tend to be made following every Arab or Muslim threat to Israel, as shown by the concerted campaign to represent the remarks of the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in 2005, as a threat of genocide against Israeli Jews. Ahmadinejad endorsed the idea that 'the occupying regime' in Palestine must collapse, but this was represented as a claim that Israel must be 'wiped off the map' and so as a genocidal threat against Israeli Jews.¹ Although it is unclear from the translation of Ahmadinejad's words that he made a genocidal threat, and even less clear that his words had anything more than a rhetorical function, no less than the International Association of Genocide Scholars passed a resolution alleging that they constituted early warning signs of genocide.² Moreover it is certainly true that Holocaust denial has become a stock in trade of some of Israel's opponents – Ahmadinejad is a high

¹ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahmoud_Ahmadinejad_and_Israel>, accessed 15 January 2009.

² *Jerusalem Post*, 7 February 2006.

profile case – even if most critics are neither Holocaust deniers nor anti-Semites (a commonly linked allegation).

Equally demonstrating the significance of genocide to the political debate, critics have argued that Israel and its advocates have used the Holocaust to validate its existence and its mistreatment of the Palestinians (Finkelstein 2000). For Israel's critics, therefore, it may seem reasonable to ask whether the state's dispossession, subjugation and often violent repression of the Palestinians – from the Nakba ('Catastrophe') of 1948 to the attack on Gaza in 2009 – could also justify the genocide label, one which would, of course, establish the fundamental illegitimacy of Israeli policies. After all, Matan Vilnai, Israel's deputy defence minister, warning on 28 February 2008 that his country was close to launching a huge military operation in Gaza (which of course it did ten months later), said Palestinians would bring on themselves a 'bigger shoah', using the Hebrew word usually reserved for the Holocaust. Although his spokesman later tried to play down the force of his language, saying he meant only 'disaster', and that 'he did not mean to make any allusion to the genocide', Vilnai's genocidal rhetoric, even if unpremeditated and withdrawn, suggested the sensitivity of the issue.³ The eventual onslaught did little to calm the raw nerve that Vilnai had touched. If the Nakba constituted genocide, Palestinian advocates could then trade off 'their' genocide story against Israel's own foundational myth. (I use 'myth' here not to suggest that the story is simply false, but that, however important the elements of truth in it, it plays here a certain political and cultural role). The consequence might be a leveling of the political field, but without necessarily shedding much more light on the situation.

However there is another, rather different, justification for introducing a genocide perspective. It proceeds from the assumption that genocide is an important concept of social and historical analysis, and that applying a genocide perspective will help us to explore and explain the Palestinian crisis of the last six decades in an illuminating way. In order that a genocide perspective can fulfill this role, however, it is necessary to discuss what genocide means, why the concept is important, and how it should be used in historical analysis. As a genocide theorist who is not an Israel-Palestine specialist, I offer this analysis on the assumption is that we need to examine these questions *in general* before we can seriously approach the specific case. One reason for this is that the genocide field and the Israel-Palestine debate in particular are overladen with political and ideological preconceptions. Another, more important, is that one cannot establish the significance of genocide for Israel-Palestine simply by comparing it to other particular cases (for example, the very different circumstances of the Holocaust or other episodes in the victimisation of European Jews). In order to approach the question of genocide in the Israel-Palestine history, it is necessary first to establish clear *general* conceptual, analytical and historical frameworks.

I. The Idea of Genocide and its Scope

The problem of the idea of genocide is that while it has always been intended to have a general applicability in historical and social understanding, it was developed in a specific context, and has been in turn distorted by the common understanding of its relationship to this context. Raphael Lemkin (1944) coined the word 'genocide' in *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, a study of the social destruction committed by Nazi Germany and its allies during the Second World War. Lemkin intended the concept as the basis of a new international crime, and he succeeded in persuading the United Nations to draft a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was adopted in December 1948, just months (as it happened) after the war during which the majority of the Arab population were forced to leave the areas of Palestine controlled or conquered by the new state of Israel. Indeed it was during the period of the Convention's drafting process that the United Nations had adopted the proposal for the partition of Mandate Palestine which led to the foundation of Israel.

³ *The Guardian*, 1 March 2008.

Lemkin defined genocide as 'the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group' but he warned against a narrow interpretation: 'Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves' (Lemkin 1944: 79). The nuances of the defining word, 'destruction', were indicated here by the difference between 'immediate destruction' of a nation and 'destruction of essential foundations' of its life. Lemkin was clear that genocide refers *generally* to the latter; 'immediate' destruction in the sense of 'mass killings of all members of a nation' – which the Nazis practiced against European Jews – was a specific type but did *not* define genocide.

The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) provided a legal definition, the result of two years' drafting and debate among the member-states of the UN, in which it was re-defined as a range of 'acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such', and specifically '(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group'. Although the UN definition was a political compromise which created various problems, some of which I discuss further below, it maintained the core of Lemkin's broad approach, and of course it has had the force of law and the benefit of international authority, and has therefore naturally formed the basis of legal and political discussion of subsequent cases. Less obviously, it has also formed an analytical benchmark for much academic analysis, although many scholars have also grappled with the perceived limitations of the UN's (and Lemkin's) definitions and have offered new formulations (for a survey of these see Shaw 2007: 17-36).

Clearly both Lemkin and the UN drafters were heavily influenced by the immediate historical legacy of Nazism, but in different ways. Lemkin, although a Polish Jew who grew up in a Zionist environment and remained sympathetic to Zionism, did not separate Jewish victimisation from the wider destruction of national societies and cultures which Nazism perpetrated across occupied Europe. Nor did he separate the exterminatory murderousness of the final stages of Nazi anti-Jewish policy from the general social, economic, political and cultural destruction which was inflicted on the Jews and other peoples before and throughout the Second World War. Instead his was a broad concept of genocide and he believed that many different population groups had suffered, albeit to very different extents, from Nazi genocide. The UN, on the other hand, laid greater emphasis on killing as the principal (but not the only) means of genocide, and left considerable ambiguity as to the scope of the crime. The later move by some scholars to narrow the meaning of genocide towards simple mass killing also corresponded with a growing tendency to view Nazi genocide solely in terms of the Final Solution (now known as the Holocaust) – a very much narrower account than Lemkin's (in the *reductio ad absurdum* of this tendency, the Holocaust became indeed the only pure case of genocide in history: Katz 1994).

Clearly the academic study of genocide needs to resolve this divergence, and the confusion it often creates as to the proper use of the term, in a coherent and consistent way which enables us to apply the concept to a range of cases. While it is possible to formulate a maximalist concept which equates genocide simply with mass killing, this seems sociologically deficient. Killing is (as both Lemkin and the Convention recognised) only one *means* by which armed power organisations (states, parties, regimes, armies, militia etc.) attack and seek to destroy largely civilian social groups or populations. From the point of view of social and political analysis, it seems more coherent to focus on the *aim* of 'destroying' a group or population (which is indeed how Lemkin, the Convention and most subsequent scholars have understood genocide) rather than a particular *means*, however terrible, used to achieve it. Indeed concerning means, while the finality of death for the individual seems to make killing the ultimate form of violence, it is not self-evident that it is actually more defining of genocide – or worse in a moral sense – than other forms such as rape and torture. Nor indeed is it clear that other coercive means (such as economic, political and cultural dispossession, all of which Lemkin emphasised) are less significant for the destruction of a group than physical violence.

What is clear, however, is that if the genocide concept is to be useful we need ways of delimiting it from other types of action and conflict. First, we need to distinguish genocidal violence from other *violence*, such as that of war. The key distinction here is clearly that in genocide, a essentially *civilian group or population* is the *enemy* targeted for violence, whereas in war the enemy is another armed actor. (Of course civilians may also be targeted as a way of attacking the armed enemy: I call this 'degenerate war': Shaw 2003: 23-26, 45). Second, we need to distinguish genocidal action against a group or population from *forms of oppression or repression* which fall short of genocide. The distinction here can only be the *destructive* character of the anti-group policy in genocide. Genocidal action aims not just to contain, control, or subordinate a population, but to shatter and break up its social existence. Thus genocide is defined, not by a particular form of violence, but by general and pervasive violence.

These definitions still leave genocide a broad and complex concept: the destruction of a group will always be multi-faceted, and the relationships between different methods (e.g. between killing, expulsion and cultural suppression) will vary between cases. They also leave us with complex analytical tasks: for even if we may *distinguish* genocide from war or repression, in historical reality they are usually closely *related*. Genocide is often closely entwined with war, and is generally preceded and often succeeded by forms of repression which are not in themselves genocidal. How genocide and war are related, and how repressive policies are transformed into genocide (and sometimes back again), are constant tensions in any study of the problem, and are essential considerations in any discussion of the Israel-Palestine case.

Genocide in Modern History

The academic study of genocide is a relatively new enterprise. Modern genocide studies really began with a series of general and comparative volumes published by social scientists from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. The field became increasingly characterised as one of 'comparative' study, and the work of this first wave was deepened in the early to mid-2000s by a second which comprised a number of large-scale volumes, by both social scientists and historians, comparing a number of major cases (usually Armenia, the Holocaust, Rwanda, and varying others) across time and space (Straus, 2007). However there is much dissatisfaction with this 'comparative' framework – and with related assumptions (e.g. that genocides are 'rare' events, as Straus put it) on the part of historians and other scholars who argue that it is necessary to study genocide within specific historical patterns and contexts, rather than in a transhistorical comparative setting (see for example Bloxham 2005). This has led in the 2000s to an alternative approach, historical genocide studies, in which the broader definition of the field (derived from Lemkin rather than the UN or later sociological writers) is increasingly influential.

Two major areas of historical enquiry have been important to this latest renewal of the genocide field, and both of them are relevant to the question of Israel-Palestine. The first, of course, is the growing field of colonial genocide studies. Leo Kuper's pioneering work (Kuper 1981) had emphasised the links between colonialism and genocide, and recent scholarship has greatly reinforced these. However empire and colonialism are large topics and it is clear that neither phenomenon is universally or generally genocidal. In specifying the linkages, *settler* colonialism has been seen as particularly significant. Linked as settler colonisation has been to projects of *displacing* rather than merely *dominating* pre-existing populations, it has more often involved a tendency to deliberately break up pre-existing societies than other types of imperial venture. Thus Dirk Moses (2000), analysing Australia, argues that settler colonialism was structurally prone to genocide, and the process tended to involve serial 'genocidal moments'. He sees settlers and local militia, rather than imperial authorities, as the main perpetrators. Michael Mann (who uses the term 'murderous cleansing' for what I call genocide) agrees, from a broader historical survey: 'The more settlers controlled colonial institutions, the more murderous the cleansing. ... It is the most direct relationship I have found between democratic regimes and mass murder' (Mann 2005: 4). Moreover genocide is often closely related to war, and in the context of empire and colonialism, this means that moments of conquest and resistance, or rebellion and its suppression are ones in which genocidal violence is most likely to occur. Thus in the European colonisation of the Americas, patterns of genocidal violence have occurred at various times across several centuries but without a single centre or driver (Levene 2005; Kiernan 2007).

The other major area in which new research directions have emerged concerns European genocide in the first half of the twentieth century. Holocaust research is, of course, the largest single area in the study of genocide and its strength predates the growth of genocide studies discussed above. Indeed for this reason, as well as because of the misplaced ideological idea of Holocaust 'uniqueness', Holocaust studies are often taken to constitute a separate field from the wider study of genocide. There is however an important new trend to re-link these fields (Stone 2007). There are two major dimensions of this transformation in studies of European genocide. The first has been a new recognition of the wider scope of the Nazi genocide itself. New attention has been given to the fact that the Nazi project itself had an imperial and colonial character. It involved the creation of a pan-European empire, involving grand plans for the German colonisation of the East, which accompanied the Nazi thrusts into Poland and the Soviet Union (Mazower 2007). In this perspective, the Holocaust appears not as an entirely distinct anti-Jewish project, but as the most extreme culmination of the complex and changing Nazi plans for the colonisation, enslavement and destruction of Slavs as well as Jews. This perspective returns us, of course, to Lemkin, for whom genocide was always part of the new order which the Nazis were inflicting across occupied Europe.

This perspective is important is that it corrects a tendency to distort the history of Nazi anti-Jewish policy itself. When early 'intentionalist' accounts of the Holocaust, which read it back to the Hitler's earliest anti-Semitic tirades, were countered by 'functionalist' narratives which showed the emergence of the Final Solution from the complex, changing circumstantial logics of war and occupation, there was a tendency to lose the coherence and continuity of the genocidal frame in Nazi anti-Jewish policy. The title of Christopher Browning's important study, *The Path to Genocide* (2002), for example, suggests that only with the Final Solution did Nazi policy towards the Jews become fully genocidal. This focus on mass murder obscures the fact that the Nazi rule was increasingly consistent from a relatively early stage in pursuing a general aim of *destroying Jewish society*, first in Germany and then in the rest of Europe. If this aim was not completely clear in the early years of Nazi rule – although the persecution and marginalisation of German Jews was always designed in part to reduce the Jewish population if only through flight – it had become increasingly so by 1938 when anti-Jewish violence during the Austrian *Anschluss* was followed by *Kristallnacht* (11 November). Hundreds of synagogues were burned, thousands of Jewish businesses were destroyed, cemeteries and schools were vandalised, and tens of thousands were Jews were arrested and sent to concentration camps. Taken as a whole, this campaign signaled the Nazis' intention to destroy what remained of Jewish life in Germany.

With the invasion of Poland in September 1939, Nazi policy was immediately directed towards the expulsion of both Jews and non-Jewish Poles from Western Poland, which was incorporated into the German *Reich*. This was a determined destruction of Jewish and Polish communities, with considerable cruelty, leading in the case of the Jews to their concentration in closed ghettos, where the Nazis ensured that the inhabitants had from the start totally inadequate conditions of life. By the standards of the broad conception of genocide which Lemkin proposed, and which I follow in this article, there is no doubt that *Nazi policies were already genocidal towards Poles and especially towards Jews, even if as yet there was no general murderousness. The later stages of socially destructive Nazi policies, towards both Jews and Slavs, were even more cruel and murderous, leading through several turns to the extermination camps, but these were developments of, not towards, genocide.* Genocide, simultaneously directed towards the mentally disabled within the *Reich*, was entrenched in Nazi occupation policies from the start.

The second dimension in new approaches shows that Nazi Germany was not alone in implementing genocide in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, and especially in the period leading up to, during and immediately after the Second World War. Although Nazi genocide had its own ideological and policy dynamics, it was implemented in the context of a war in which genocide was becoming an increasingly general tendency. Indeed it greatly stimulated this tendency, which itself was the culmination of half a century in which genocidal practices had been common in the eastern half of Europe (Bloxham 2008a, 2008b, 2009). The German invasion of western Poland, after all, was carried out simultaneously with the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland, following the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The Stalinist regime, whose genocidal history (Werth 2007), already included the 'liquidation of the *kulaks*' and the Terror-Famine in the Ukraine, had no

special aim of destroying Jewish society but it did aim, like the Nazis, to empty large parts of its new territory of Poles and Jews. From mid-1941, of course, when Hitler reneged on the Pact and attacked the USSR, Nazi and Soviet policies developed antagonistically rather than in cooperation. However Stalin's regime also developed new genocidal thrusts, brutally deporting whole peoples like the Chechens, Ingush and Tartars, on the grounds of their supposed unreliability in the war. And Soviet plans for the conclusion of the war increasingly envisaged the expulsion of all Germans from the USSR and its new satellite states (before 1939 Germans had been, ironically along with Jews, the most widely dispersed national group across the countries of Eastern Europe), as well as of Poles from the newly reoccupied Eastern Poland, now to be incorporated into the Soviet Union.

It can therefore be argued that both the major protagonists of the Eastern Front, the Nazi and Stalinist empires, were engaged in genocidal war, partly against each other's core nationalities and partly against 'third parties'. However this was not the limit of genocide in the European war. The other European Axis powers all had genocidal objectives – for Romania, for example, to remove the Jews and Hungarians; for Croatia, to destroy the Serbs; for Italy, to clear Slovenes and Croats from the Dalmatian coast (Ahonen et al. 2007). And from mid-war, the Allied governments-in-exile of Czechoslovakia and Poland developed, with the approval of their British hosts, plans to expel, in 'counter-genocidal' revenge, their remaining German populations who were seen as complicit in Nazi crimes (Brandes 2008). In the concluding months of the war and for several years afterwards, the Soviet Union, together with the new Czechoslovak and Polish regimes, forced large-scale population movements including the brutal expulsion of over ten million Germans, of whom at least half a million died in the process (Bloxham, 2008a: 122). These policies were ratified by the Western Allies at the Potsdam conference in 1945. The results included a destruction of German society in the East almost as comprehensive, if not nearly as murderous, as the destruction of historic Jewish society in the same regions.

The Second World War was not, therefore, only the context in which the Jewish Holocaust developed. It was, at least in eastern Europe (and also in the Far East, which there is not space to discuss here), to a considerable extent a generally genocidal war. And this was not an exceptional phase of the modern international system. On the contrary, as Bloxham (2007) has shown, this period followed from the earlier 'great game of genocide', arising from the crisis of the Ottoman Empire. This had culminated in the mass death of Armenians in 1915, but involved an equally multi-sided destruction of populations and communities, perpetrated not only by the Ottoman Empire and its successor Turkish state, but also by the new nation-states of the Balkan region, each eager to homogenise its territory at the expense of minorities. This experience of South-East Europe in the First World War fed the wider genocidal conflict in Eastern Europe in the Second.

Although we tend to think of mid-twentieth century genocide ending with the defeat of Nazism, the period 1945-49 by no means involved a transition to a post-genocidal world as the adoption of the Genocide Convention might suggest. Not only was the destruction of German communities in Eastern Europe ongoing throughout this period, with the sanction of the founding members of the United Nations and without protest from those (even Lemkin) who campaigned for the Convention. In India, too, the build up to and aftermath of independence and partition in 1947 involved extensive, organised campaigns of murder and expulsion against both Hindu and Muslim communities, which are now increasingly regarded by scholars as genocidal. Twelve million people were forced to move and hundreds of thousands died (Khan 2007; Talbot 2007). In the Indian-Pakistani case, of course, violence was not instigated by the state – either the outgoing British Raj or the new independent governments – but was carried out by militia closely linked to the rival Congress Party and Muslim League, often with the involvement of regional and local party officials, and more or less condoned by both the national leaders of these parties and by the British. In this first 'post-colonial' genocide – as indeed in many earlier 'colonial' genocides – the organisers were not singular state, regime or party centres, but nebulous networks of officials and activists intertwined with, but not officially sponsored by, the party and emerging governmental frameworks.

The Genocidal Mentality of 'Transfer' in Zionism

How is this larger genocidal history relevant to Israel-Palestine? Most of the Jewish population settled in Palestine in the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, so that the policies of the Zionist movement and the Israeli state towards Palestinian Arabs could be seen in the light of the wider pattern of settler-colonial societies. Yet the argument here suggests a modification of this perspective: we need also to pay attention to how prevalent a genocidal mentality was among nationalist elites in Eastern Europe – the milieu in which Zionism itself was formed. *It had become normal, in formulating a project for a nationally homogenous state, to envisage removing populations who did not fit.* Outside the context of war, such projects were often proposed in relatively benign ways, for example as involving voluntary 'transfers' or 'exchanges' of populations. In the aftermath of the First World War, the Western Allies (the United States, Britain and France) had endorsed proposals of this type, for example between Greece and Turkey. Yet the reality of the uprooting and expulsion of populations in this period was often a great deal more brutal than euphemisms like 'transfer' and 'exchange' suggested, and during the Second World War it reached new depths of violence.

Thus in the period immediately preceding the foundation of Israel, cruel and often murderous expulsions had been very widely practiced, and more were envisaged. The proposal here is therefore that we should view Israel's destruction of large parts of Arab society in Palestine in 1948 not simply through the perspective of settler-colonial genocide, but as an extension of the exclusivist nationalism which had recently brought about extensive genocidal violence in the European war – and perhaps even (given the complex connections between the different branches of Zionist power involved in forcing the removal of the Palestinian population) as in some senses like the 'post-colonial' genocide of the Indian Partition.

Certainly early twentieth century Zionism can be considered a settler-colonial project, 'albeit a rather peculiar one' (Levene 2007: 676). Many Zionist thinkers developed, long before the Second World War, ideas fairly typical of the settler-colonial ideology. From the movement's inception, its leaders envisaged displacing the Arab population of Palestine. Initially, displacement was conceived in gradual terms, as Theodore Herzl advocated in 1895: 'We must expropriate gently ... Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discretely and circumspectly' (quoted by Morris 2004: 41). Moreover, as Benny Morris documented, ideas of transfer were kept largely private and in the background, as 'the Zionist public catechism ... remained that there was room enough in Palestine for both peoples ... There was no need for a transfer of the Arabs' (Morris 2004: 43). And at least as long as the issue remained open, Zionist thinking also included more enlightened strands. As Levene puts it, 'drawing a straight line from Herzl through David Ben-Gurion, to Ariel Sharon and beyond, accusing them of aiming to get rid of the Palestinians, elides all manner of Zionist thinking and practice which has been more circumspect, cautious, and often energized by the potential for a Zionist – Arab relationship in which the two peoples might live together' (Levene 2007: 676-77). Moreover, he points out, Zionist thought did not develop in a vacuum. Zionist rejection of coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine was conditioned by Arab attacks on Jewish communities, especially during their 1929 uprising (Levene 2007: 676).

Nevertheless 'transfer' thinking was persistent. As Morris puts it, 'by the early 1930s a full-throated near-consensus in support of the idea began to emerge among the movement's leaders' (Morris 2004: 44). Many Zionists argued that the process could be benevolent, describing Palestinian Arabs in terms reminiscent of the anti-Semites who denied that eastern Europe was really a 'homeland' for its Jews. They argued, Nur Masalha noted, that 'the uprooting and transfer of the Palestinians to Arab countries would constitute a mere relocation from one district to another; that the Palestinians would have no difficulty in accepting Jordan, Syria, or Iraq as their homeland; that the Palestinian Arabs had little emotional attachment and few real ties to the particular soil in Palestine and would be just as content outside the "Land of Israel"; that the Palestinian Arabs were marginal to the Arab nation and their problems might be facilitated by a "benevolent" and "humanitarian" policy of "helping people to leave"' (Masalha 1997: x). However, as Morris argued, 'the logic of a transfer solution to the "Arab problem" remained ineluctable; without some sort of massive displacement of Arabs from the area of the Jewish state-to-be, there could be no viable Jewish state' (Morris 2004: 43).

Interestingly the term used for 'transfer' then, as now, was the Hebrew word *tihur*, which is closer in meaning to 'purification' or 'cleansing' of the land, and thus puts this strand of Zionist thinking close to the 'ethnic cleansing' and 'racial purification' ideologies typical of radical nationalist projects. Fantasies of benevolent transfer had been, of course, commonplace in Europe during the previous half-century, and were particularly indulged whenever the Western powers gave their sanction - thus the Potsdam protocol had required that the transfer of Germans be 'orderly' and 'humane'. However Giorgio Balladore Pallieri reported in 1952 that among twenty 'population transfer' treaties between 1913 and 1945, 'there has never been a truly voluntary transfer of populations' (quoted by Schabas 2000: 195-96). The reality of forced population movements was universally destructive, even if the level of brutality varied. How could it be otherwise? However variable populations' attachments to national ideas and territories, their attachment to *their* land, homes, villages and towns could hardly be doubted. For example, Jewish populations in Europe, often rejected as outsiders, nevertheless had serious attachments to the places in which they lived (Ceserani, Kushner and Milton 2009). In fixed agrarian societies, and by extension in the growing urban concentrations, communities were closely embedded in territorial relations. To envisage breaking up these territorial concentrations was to threaten the destruction of the communities themselves.

Thus the ideology of transfer generally pointed in a genocidal direction, even if it was not a sufficient condition for the implementation of genocide. Morris' argument (2004: 60) that 'transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism - because it sought to transform a land which was "Arab" into a "Jewish" state and a Jewish state could not have arisen without a major displacement of Arab population', is undeniable. Nevertheless Morris argues cogently that the pre-war Zionist consensus for transfer 'was not tantamount to pre-planning and did not issue in the production of a policy or master-plan for expulsion ...' (Morris 2004: 60). Rather we can conclude that pre-war Zionism included the development of an *incipiently genocidal mentality* towards Arab society, rather in a manner that many European nationalist fantasies of the time tended to regard 'other' populations in territories that they regarded as properly part of 'their' own nation-state.

During the Second World War, Zionist leaders developed their thoughts on transfer very much in the light of European developments. In October 1941, for example, David Ben-Gurion discussed in his diary the problems of 'transfer', in terms which Morris summarises: a complete transfer of the bulk of the Arab population could only be carried out by force, by "ruthless compulsion", in Ben-Gurion's phrase. However recent European history, Ben-Gurion pointed out, had demonstrated that a massive, compulsory transfer of populations was possible - and the ongoing world war had made the idea of transfer even more popular as the surest and most practical way to solve the difficult and dangerous problem of national minorities. The post-war settlement in Europe, he envisioned, would include massive transformation transfers' (Morris 2001: 45).

Not only did Zionist leaders have a good grasp of the contemporary politics of population upheaval: they were not averse to dialogue with some of its most callous practitioners. Morris also quotes an account of a meeting which Chaim Weizmann, president of the Zionist Organisation, held with Ivan Maisky, Stalin's ambassador to London, in January 1941 - when the Soviet Union still occupied eastern Poland as a result of its non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, and was busy removing much of the Polish and Jewish population almost as the Germans were doing in western Poland. Weizmann seemed unconcerned with this aspect, instead canvassing Maisky on the prospects of moving the Palestinian Arabs 'into Iraq or Transjordan'. 'Dr. Weizmann said that if half a million Arabs could be transferred, two million Jews could be put in their place.' However he did explain 'that they were unable to deal with [the Arabs] as, for instance, the Russian authorities would deal with a backward element in their population in the USSR. Nor would they desire to do so' (Morris 2001: 46.)

The Partial Destruction of Palestinian Arab Society in 1948

Events seven years later might lead us to suggest that, when it came to putting 'transfer' into practice, Israel's attitude was closer to Maisky's (and Stalin's) than to Weizmann's more benign view. The reasons for this do not necessarily indicate that more 'liberal' attitudes were completely false; rather that the idea of 'voluntary transfer' was an illusion which could never survive implementation, especially not in circumstances of war.

Of course the events of 1948 have been widely discussed among specialists, and there remains substantial disagreement. What a non-specialist like the present writer can most usefully do, rather than to produce a general reading of the debate, is to indicate the way in which a genocide perspective relates to the disputed issues.

Morris, who among the 'revisionist' historians presents the view which suggests the least degree of Israeli planning for the destruction of Arab society, argues that 'the Yishuv [the Jewish community] and its military forces did not enter the 1948 war, which was initiated by the Arab side, with a policy or plan for expulsion' (Morris 2004: 60). Rather, he suggested in his first book, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1947* (1986), the circumstances of the war brought about the flight of much of the Arab population, although Israeli forces did coerce and deliberately expel some Palestinians. This view was challenged by other historians, both by those like Nur Masalha (1997) who wished to suggest a necessarily tighter connection between the ideology of 'transfer' and the removal of the non-Jewish population, and by others like Laila Parsons (2001) who pointed to the discrimination within Israeli policies towards that population, so that a group like the Druze, whose leaders had allied themselves with the Zionists, were generally spared the destruction which was visited on most of the remainder. Parsons argued that this discrimination was evidence that purposeful Israeli policies lay behind the removal and sometimes massacre of the Arab population. In the revised version of his book, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, Morris (2004) too acknowledged a substantially greater role for Israeli force in the destruction of Palestinian society. However he still argues that there was no overarching plan; rather that the war provided a situation in which the Israeli forces were able to secure the removal of the Arabs, which as pre-war Zionist thought had envisaged, was required by the logic of their project, and that Israeli leaders and forces took advantage of the opportunities presented in the war.

The other pole of the argument is Ilan Pappé's *Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (2007). Pappé provides sustained evidence of systematic preparations for the dispossession of the Arabs by Ben-Gurion's leadership group, the 'Consultancy', prior to the war, and how these were implemented during it. On his account, it is clear that there had been extensive collection of information concerning the Arab population with a view to removing most of them from the areas allocated to Israel under the UN proposals, so as to achieve a Jewish majority in the new state. It is also clear that a coherent policy of removal was pursued during the war, even if its implementation was influenced by decisions on the ground during the conflict. Mark Levene, in perhaps the most careful review to date, while criticising Pappé for writing out the role of earlier Arab violence against Jews in radicalising Zionist thinking and also for understating the role of Arab resistance in 1948, agrees that Pappé has assembled his material

in a manner which confirms that the ethnic cleansing of Palestine is comparable to other such cases, and indeed can only be properly seen and understood within the wider pattern. Up to a point, Pappé makes this position overt with leading references to Serbian actions, or UN and other commentary upon them, in the course of the 1990s struggles for Yugoslavia. While for some readers this may again read as unduly provocative, it is not misplaced. Pappé unequivocally demonstrates that the drive towards the removal of the Palestinians came from the top. Demotic elements there are: land-hungry kibbutniks intent on grabbing as much neighbouring Arab land as they can; greedy Tel-Aviv townies quick to recognize the once-in-a-lifetime opportunities to be had from the flight of Jaffa neighbours and the rapid seizure of their property and assets. But, as in so many similar examples worldwide, such despicable behaviour is not cause but effect ... The drive for *tihur* – cleansing – emanated from the Consultancy (Levene 2007: 678).

It should be noted that Pappé does not mention the word 'genocide'. However he introduces the term 'ethnic cleansing' to describe Israel's policies in 1948, and Levene endorses Pappé's choice of category without question, writing simply, after summarising what happened to the Palestinians in 1948, 'on all this, only one verdict is available, and it is the one that Pappé uses: ethnic cleansing' (Levene (2007: 680). Yet Pappé adopts what can only be described as a naïve approach to his central concept, relying on definitions of 'ethnic cleansing' provided by dictionaries, Wikipedia and the UNHCR, and completely ignoring academic

writers who have utilised this term (Bell-Fialkoff 1996; Naimark 2001; Mann 2005), let alone those who have criticised its use (Shaw 2007: 48-62). Pappé regards 'ethnic cleansing' as a 'well-defined concept' and 'paradigm', when in reality it is difficult and contested. And when Pappé and Levene compare the Israeli 'cleansing' in Palestine with the Serbian 'cleansing' in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they fail to acknowledge that the latter has often been regarded as involving genocide (e.g. Sells 1998).

'Ethnic Cleansing' and Genocide

This is not the place to engage in a full history of the idea of 'ethnic cleansing': suffice it to say that the idea had present throughout the twentieth century in the many-sided ethnic expulsions in the Balkans, and re-emerged during the early 1990s violence. Moreover the idea of 'cleansing' (and closely related ideas like racial 'purification') had been common to many European nationalist projects of removal and expulsion, including both Nazis and Zionism. However before the Bosnian war, the phrase 'ethnic cleansing' as such was not widely used outside the Balkans. What was new in the 1990s was that the term was adopted by the international media covering Bosnia, then by international organisations, political leaders and even international lawyers (although of course it is not a defined legal category). It was eventually adopted by some scholars like Bell-Fialkoff and Naimark, even becoming a master concept of political violence in the work of Mann.

There were, however, from the start questions about the relationship of 'ethnic cleansing' to genocide. Population expulsion was clearly designed, in Bosnia and elsewhere, to *destroy* particular ethnic or national communities, even if it did not necessarily entail the mass murder of all or most of the members of these communities. In this sense it certainly fell within the scope of genocide as Lemkin had originally defined it. It also came within the UN Convention's general definition of genocide as the deliberate destruction of a group. However the proposal that expulsion of populations should be *specifically* considered within the latter's scope had received short shrift during the drafting debates in the late 1940s, because it was recognised that expulsion was being practiced or approved on all sides including by UN member-states. Yet by the same token, expulsion was, of course, the most common method for the 'destruction' of population groups that not only Lemkin, but also the Convention, defined as a genocide. So this was a very significant, indeed fundamental, lacuna, of which the Convention's drafters were clearly aware, as William Schabas notes: "There is no doubt that the drafters of the Convention quite deliberately resisted attempts to encompass the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing within the punishable acts. According to the comments accompanying the Secretariat draft, the proposed definition excluded "certain acts which may result in the total or partial destruction of a group of human beings ... namely ... mass displacements of population"" (Schabas 2000: 196).

There is therefore deep ambiguity about the relationship of 'ethnic cleansing' to the international legal concept of genocide. This has repeatedly surfaced in the period since the 1990s when the law of genocide has finally begun to be enforced. Some judges (e.g. the Cambridge international lawyer Elihu Lauterpacht, nominated by the Bosnian Government as an *ad hoc* judge in the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia) have considered 'ethnic cleansing' as a form of genocide (Shaw 2007: 50-51), both because of its manifest fit with the overall idea of group 'destruction', and because some of the means prescribed in the Convention, e.g. killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, refer to acts commonly committed during expulsions. The majority of judges and legal authorities have, however, adopted a narrower interpretation. The Yugoslav Tribunal, for example, although on occasion ruling 'ethnic cleansing' to be genocide, has generally avoided this conclusion. This view has been followed by the International Court of Justice, which in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina versus Serbia (2007) ruled that only the massacre at Srebrenica (1995) constituted a case of genocide; the general 'ethnic cleansing' of Serbian-occupied Bosnia between 1991 and 1995 did not.

The emergence of 'ethnic cleansing' as a distinct category, purporting to describe something different from genocide, complemented the tendency to narrow the meaning of genocide discussed above. As we have seen, some of the sociological literature had defined genocide as being either exclusively or predominantly a matter of mass murder. This fitted in turn with the assumption in popular discourse that the Holocaust was the archetypal case of genocide. In Bosnia, the destruction of communities was perpetrated without any attempt

to murder all their members: although 50,000-100,000 people probably died, some were combatants and only a minority even of the worst-hit groups were murdered. While others were wounded or raped, and the suffering of those forced from their homes was palpably deep, the perception was that the majority were 'only' forced to flee and so this was not as bad as the Holocaust. This perception fed the political and legal tendency to distinguish what was happening as 'ethnic cleansing' rather than genocide. This tendency has continued in other situations like Darfur, where since 2003 the Sudanese government and its militia allies have waged a campaign to destroy many local communities. It is linked, of course, to the political interest of Western governments and the UN in avoiding the recognition of genocide, an interest manifested even in Rwanda where the degree of murderousness was extremely high.

It is not clear, however, that we can usefully adopt the concept of 'ethnic cleansing' as an alternative to 'genocide'. 'Ethnic cleansing' incorporates the perpetrator idea of 'cleansing', and even scholars who have adopted the term admit that this is a problem: 'The term "cleansing" itself is ambiguous. In everyday use it has positive connotations of cleanliness and purification ... But when applied to human populations it refers to refugees, deportation, and detention. It spells suffering. And that is why the term is widely used: it is a euphemism that hides the ugly truth' (Bell-Failkoff 1996: 3-4). Naimark (2001: 193) acknowledges: 'There is nothing "clean" about ethnic cleansing. It is shot through with violence and brutality in the most extreme form'. Likewise Schabas, who argues that legally 'cleansing' is not necessarily genocide, also calls it a 'euphemism for genocide' (2001: 194). Obviously organised violence against civilians cannot be genuinely cleansing, even for perpetrators, let alone for victims or society at large. If the language of dirt and cleanliness applies, surely it is the 'cleansers' who foul social life, which needs purification from their violence. 'Ethnic cleansing' is thus a euphemistic perpetrator term which has no place in social science or history, which is why in this discussion I have kept it within inverted commas.

The question remains, however, whether – shorn of this language – the concept refers to a distinctive reality. Yet when advocates attempt to specify its content, there is more fuzziness. For Bell-Failkoff (1996: 1), 'Population cleansing [his broader version of the 'ethnic cleansing' concept] ... defies easy definition. It covers a wide range of phenomena from genocide at one end to subtle pressure to emigrate at the other'. Moreover 'while all types of cleansing involve population removal, not all forms of removal constitute cleansing'. Naimark (2001: 3-4) is clear that the boundary between non-genocidal 'cleansing' and genocide might be unreal: 'Further complicating the distinctions between ethnic cleansing and genocide is the fact that forced deportation seldom takes place without violence, often murderous violence. People do not leave their homes on their own ... They resist ... The result is that forced deportation often becomes genocidal, as people are violently ripped from their native towns and villages and killed when they try to stay. Even when forced deportation is not genocidal in its intent, it is often genocidal in its effects'. Here Naimark let the cat out of the bag. How could 'forced deportation' ever be achieved without extreme coercion, indeed violence? How, indeed, could deportation not be forced? How could people not resist? How could it not involve the destruction of a community, of the way of life that a group has enjoyed over a period of time? How could those who deported a group not intend this destruction? In what significant way is the forcible removal of a population from their homeland different from the 'destruction' of a group? If the boundary between 'cleansing' and genocide is unreal, why police it?

To return to Palestine: clearly no one contends that Israel intended to commit the extensive mass murder of the Arab population, and so in terms of a narrow understanding of genocide, there is no case to discuss. The Nakba was not the Final Solution, and a simple comparison of the two is utterly inappropriate, even if earlier episodes in the Nazi genocide of the Jews, such as the 1939-40 expulsion from western Poland into ghettos in central Poland, provide more debatable comparisons. Palestine in 1948 was indeed (as Pappé suggests) much more like Bosnia, where a *minority* of the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) population was murdered as part of a violent and coercive campaign to terrorise the *majority* of the population into leaving the territory controlled by Republika Srpska – the state which the Serbian nationalists were carving out of previously unified Bosnia-Herzegovina, rather as Jewish nationalists were carving their state out of Palestine over forty years earlier. And yet although the Bosnian case has often been described in terms of 'ethnic cleansing', it makes sense as one of genocide, using a broad concept of genocide similar to that originally proposed by Lemkin, or a broad interpretation of the UN Convention. This is because the aim of the Serbian nationalists was certainly to destroy the Bosniak (and Croat) communities within the territory of their state:

moreover they were overwhelmingly largely successful, since only about one-tenth of the pre-war non-Serb population remained after their campaign.

However one should not push any analogy too far. Genocide studies is bedeviled by excessive case-to-case comparison at the expense of the clear application of concepts. The question is whether, and if so how, a coherent, broad concept of genocide applies to Palestine. In the debates about 1948, none of the 'revisionist' historians who now dominate the field doubt that deliberate Israeli policies made a substantial contribution to the destruction of the larger part of historical Arab society in Palestine. This creates *prima facie* a strong case for considering the events partially within a genocide framework. Equally, no serious scholar contends that Israel had a *single* policy of destroying the *whole* of Arab society. Even if Zionist leaders might have preferred an exclusively Jewish society in the whole of Palestine, they were operating to a considerable extent within the constraints of the United Nations partition plan, providing for a Palestinian state in part of the former Mandate territory, and under international surveillance. They took advantage of the war to extend the boundaries of the Israeli state beyond those allocated by the UN, and to expel large parts of the Arab population throughout the areas they controlled. Their aim was clearly to assure as large as possible a state, with a large Jewish majority, but not to expel all Arabs from Palestine or indeed from Israeli territory.

Therefore even on Morris's account, the widespread destruction of Arab society should be considered partly genocidal, in the broad sense that I have indicated in this chapter. Although some death and flight resulted fairly randomly from the war, much of it is acknowledged as the result of deliberate decisions of the Zionist political and military leaderships, local commanders and officials. On the basis of Morris's account, this was genocide in which, despite the genocidal ideology of 'transfer' which had clearly informed much Zionist thinking, Israel entered without an overarching plan, so that its specific genocidal thrusts developed situationally and incrementally, through local as well as national decisions. On this account, this was a partly decentred, networked genocide, developing in interaction with the Palestinian and Arab enemy, in the context of war. (However it could not have been as decentred as the contemporaneous genocides of Muslims and Hindus in the Indian Partition, since clearly the national Zionist leadership had much more firmly embraced a genocidal ideology of transfer than had the national leaderships of India and Pakistan, and was much closer than them to the practical business of expulsion.) On Pappé's account, on the other hand, genocide was much more centrally planned and coordinated in practice, and resulted from a strong, coherent aim of the Zionist leadership to break up much of Arab society and drive most of the Arabs from Israeli-controlled land.

It is not for me, as a non-specialist, to resolve these differences, although I agree with Levene that while Pappé may understate the contingent elements of the 1948 expulsions, he has established a strong case that 'the drive ... came from the top'. What I can do is the place these disagreements in the context of comparative genocide research. The trend among scholars has been to move away from the absolutist, singular conceptions of 'intention' (apparently demanded by the law of genocide), regarding these as historically and sociologically unrealistic. The trend here was set in Holocaust studies: despite Hitler's undeniably genocidal ideology that can be traced to *Mein Kampf* and before, few now believe that the Nazis had a consistent aim of mass extermination before 1941, and all serious historians acknowledge that they developed policy piecemeal and in response to changing situations. Mann (2005: 7) generalises this: 'Murderous cleansing [his preferred term] is rarely the original intent of perpetrators [but] typically emerges as a kind of Plan C, developed only after the first two responses to a perceived ethnic threat fail ... To understand the outcome, we must analyze the unintended consequences of a series of interactions yielding escalation'. Moreover scholars are also less inclined to see genocide as a purely top-down affair: there is always a relation between different levels of state and society, involving what Mann (2005: 7) calls the relationships between three elements: radical elites, paramilitaries, and 'core constituencies' in society.

Thus to regard the Nakba as an episode of genocide it is not necessary to demonstrate a completely pre-formed, consistent intention on the part of Zionist leaders. On the contrary, it would be surprising if, in the context of a fast-moving political and military situation, it had *not* developed and adapted its policies in the light of new constraints and opportunities. Nor is it necessary to suggest that the various elements of the destruction of Arab society were decided *only* at the highest levels of Zionism, rather than in some combination of the Consultancy, various levels of military authority and local political leaderships. The

relationships between pre-formed policy and contingent adaptation, and between central leadership and other actors, are empirical questions, not criteria of genocide.

Genocide and Israel Today

Although genocide is sometimes treated as a rare, exceptional event, somehow apart from normal history, unfortunately the violent destruction of societies has been a common event. Many societies have such episodes in their pasts. It is not only Germany that has to come to terms with such a history: countries like the United States and Australia have had genocidal moments, at least, in their destruction of indigenous communities, and many states in eastern and central Europe are heirs to the destruction not just of Jewry but of national minorities. In many cases, histories are suppressed – or at least their genocidal dimensions denied – and when they are uncovered, the consequences are often radical. Episodes of destruction mark the states and societies that perpetrate them. Not surprisingly, in view of the fate of European Jewry, many find the Palestinian history of dispossession and violence particularly shocking: as Levene comments,

The story may be soberingly familiar when set alongside other instances of ethnic cleansing or atrocity in the modern world. But this hardly makes it less shocking. Indeed, given that these operations occurred just two or three years after the end of the Holocaust, the ease with which they took on the aspect of a standard operating procedure is little short of sickening. After its onset in the initial tentative attacks, the general lack of Arab resistance provided a green light to a formula in which villages were surrounded, often at night or at dawn, and a range of ordnance loosed off to cause panic. The village having usually then surrendered, able men and boys were lined up, and sometimes shot – on the spot, or elsewhere. In worse cases, some where resistance had occurred, sometimes where it had not, a more general massacre ensued (Levene 2007: 678).

Israel's destruction of the larger part of Palestinian Arab society in 1948 was not exceptionally murderous ('only' a few thousand Arabs were massacred), nor was it complete (an Arab minority remained within the Israeli state). Yet it can be argued that the consequences for Israel and the region have been more severe than in many other cases. In part this is *because* the Palestinians mostly survived, including within Israel, and were able to develop a national movement, with support from the Arab world. Yet it is also because for Israel's leaders, the national project was evidently incomplete. Subsequent phases of the conflict, although not marked by large-scale violent expulsions and induced flight as in 1948, have provided Israel with opportunities to extend its confiscation of Arab land and to continue piecemeal the displacement of population. Israel has of course used its security concerns as a rationale for settlement and complex geographical control, both designed to make Palestinian communities unviable and force individuals and families to move. These continuing policies can be seen as the 'slow-motion' extension and consolidation of the genocide of 1948 (Makdisi 2008).

However, we must beware of a simple tendency to see all Israel's policies as genocide. I write in the aftermath of its 2009 assault on Gaza. This caused a furore in email debates among members of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, as some rebelled against its earlier pro-Israeli bias and wished to describe the latest atrocities as 'genocide'. This seems to me the wrong way to look at these events: in Gaza in 2009, Israel did not aim to destroy Palestinian society, but to impose a severe collective punishment on that society for its support of Hamas, while attempting to destroy, physically as well as militarily, that organisation itself. (Ironically it was the attempt to assassinate Hamas members, killing their families, which seemed closer to genocide than the punishment of the general population.) I draw a rather different conclusion: the consequence of a society founded on genocide in these circumstances is a situation of more or less permanent war. So long as Israel does not come to terms with the genocide of 1948 and its enduring injustice, its leaders will continue to resort to brutal, degenerate war as a method of keeping the Palestinians in their place. A society thus founded cannot hope either for integrity or for security.

References

Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew (1996) *Ethnic Cleansing* (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

- Bloxham, Donald (2007) *The Great Game of Genocide* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- (2008) 'The Great Unweaving: The Removal of Peoples in Europe, 1875-1949', in Richard Bessel and Claudia Haake, eds., *Removing Peoples* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 167-208.
- (2009) *The Final Solution – A Genocide* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Brandes, Detlef (2008) 'National and International Planning of the “Transfer” of Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland', in Richard Bessel and Claudia Haake, eds., *Removing Peoples* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 286-87.
- Cesarani, David, Tony Kushner and Shain Milton (2009) eds., *Place and Displacement in Jewish History and Memory: Zakor V'Makor* (London: Vallentine Mitchell).
- Chalk, Frank and Kurt Jonassohn (1990) *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven: Yale University Press).
- Fein, Helen (1990) 'Genocide: A Sociological Perspective', *Current Sociology* 38: 1-126
- Finkelstein, Norman (2000) *The Holocaust Industry* (London: Verso).
- Kahn, Yasmin (2007) *The Great Partition* (New Haven: Yale University Press).
- Katz, Stephen (1994) *The Holocaust in Historical Context*, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Khalidi, Rashid (2001) 'The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure', in Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 12-36.
- Kiernan, Ben (2007) *Blood and Soil* (New Haven: Yale University Press).
- Kuper, Leo (1981) *Genocide* (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
- Lemkin, Raphael (1944) *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
- Levene, Mark (2005) *Genocide in the Age of the Nation State: Volume 2, The Rise of the West* (London: I. B. Tauris).
- (2007) Review of Ilan Pappé's *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, *Journal of Genocide Research*, 9, 4, December: 675–81.
- Makdisi, Saree (2008) *Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation* (London: Norton).
- Mann, Michael (2005) *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Masalha, Nur (1997) *A Land Without a People: Israel, Transfer and the Palestinians 1949-96* (London: Faber and Faber).
- Morris, Benny (1986) *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- (2001) 'Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948', in Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 37-59.
- (2004) *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Moses, A. Dirk (2000) 'An antipodean genocide? The origins of the genocidal moment in the colonization of Australia', *Journal of Genocide Research* 2, 1: 89-106.
- (2004) ed., *Genocide and Settler Society* (Oxford: Berghahn).
- Naimark, Norman (2001) *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
- Pappé, Ilan (2007) *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: OneWorld).
- Parsons, Laila (2001) 'The Druze and the birth of Israel', in Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 60-78.
- Rogan, Eugene L. and Avi Shlaim (2001) eds., *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Schabas, William (2000) *Genocide in International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Sells, Michael A. (1998) *A Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Shaw, Martin (2003) *War and Genocide* (Cambridge: Polity).
- (2007) *What is Genocide?* (Cambridge: Polity).
- Shlaim, Avi (2001) 'Israel and the Arab coalition in 1948', in Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 79-103.
- Stannard, David (1992) *American Holocaust: The Conquest of the New World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

- Stone, Dan (2007) 'The Historiography of the Holocaust', in Dan Stone, ed., *The Historiography of Genocide* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan): 373-99.
- Straus, Scott (2007) 'Second-Generation Comparative Research on Genocide', *World Politics* 59 (April): 476-501.
- Talbot, Ian (2007) 'The 1947 Partition of India', in Dan Stone, ed., *The Historiography of Genocide* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan): 420-37.
- Nicholas Werth (2007) 'The Crimes of the Stalin Regime: Outline for an Inventory and Classification', in Dan Stone, ed., *The Historiography of Genocide* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan): 400-19.